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ABSTRACT:  This paper examines individual trade policy preferences across the 17 
countries in Latin America. The focus is on whether skilled or unskilled workers are 
more likely to support liberalized trade and on whether country characteristics, such as 
factor endowments, alter the preferences of skilled and unskilled workers. Based on the 
standard Heckscher-Ohlin model and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, wage inequality in 
developing countries will decrease under free trade and unskilled workers will benefit.  
We find that on average skilled workers are more likely than unskilled workers to support 
free trade in Latin American countries. Separate country regressions reveal that this 
pattern is only statistically significant in 8 out of 17 Latin American countries. However, 
there are no countries in our sample in which unskilled workers are statistically more 
likely to support free trade than skilled workers. Not even in the lowest skill endowed 
country among our 17 Latin American countries. We also find that people from Latin 
American countries with higher GDP, faster growth, more cropland, and a longer period 
of time since reform were more likely on average to support free trade.     
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1.  Introduction 
Examining the impact of international trade liberalization on the wage and 
employment of different workers (and hence their support for trade) is a large and 
growing literature. One empirical finding that has emerged from this literature is that the 
wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers has been increasing recently in both 
developed and developing countries.  According to Das (2002), wage inequality has 
increased in Mexico and Chile but decreased in the Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan. 
Robbins (1996) found that the wage gap grew in Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica and 
Argentina, but it fell in Malaysia and the Philippines.  Zhu and Trefler (2001) examine 
evidence from Gini coefficients of 29 developing and newly industrialized countries and 
found wage gaps increased in 16 countries, decreased in 12 countries, and did not change 
in one country.  Wage inequality has increased in some, but not all developing countries. 
The two most often cited causes of this labor market phenomenon are trade liberalization 
and skill-biased technological change. 
Based on the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, 
wage inequality in developing countries will decrease under free trade and unskilled 
workers will benefit. Moreover, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem within the Heckscher-
Ohlin model suggests that trade could not be the driving force behind increased wage 
inequality in both developed and developing countries because according to this theorem, 
wage inequality would increase in the relatively skill-abundant (developed) countries and 
decline in the relatively skill-scarce (developing) countries.  Skilled-biased technological 
change may be the culprit but requires an explanation for why wage inequality is 
increasing in some, but not all, developing countries.     
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Here we depart from the traditional literature by using opinion surveys on trade in 
Latin America, taken at a time after many of these developing countries embarked on 
large policy changes towards liberalization. We examine individual level characteristics 
with a focus on the skill level of the respondent. We also examine country level 
characteristics to explore who supports and who opposes free trade in Latin America.  
We examine what country-level characteristics affected the overall probability of support 
for trade and whether country characteristics modified the difference in preference 
between skilled and unskilled workers. That is, we examine whether skilled workers from 
relatively skill-endowed countries support trade and whether unskilled workers from 
relatively unskill-endowed countries support trade.    
This line of research contributes to recent research on trade and wages that looks at 
trade policy preferences from survey data. Recent research by O’Rourke and Sinnott 
(2001), Beaulieu et al (2004), Baker (2005), and Mayda and Rodrik (2005) find that 
skilled workers are more likely to support free trade than unskilled workers across    
24 high-income and transitional economies.  However, the notable exception from this 
result is the Philippines, where unskilled workers are more supportive of trade 
liberalization than skilled workers.  The Philippines is the poorest country in the sample 
of countries. Mayda and Rodrik (2005) interpret these results as being consistent with the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem of the HOS model.  Beaulieu et al (2004) interpret these 
results as inconsistent with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.   
The main hurdle in resolving this debate is that the countries examined in the two 
papers are limited in the coverage of developing countries.  In this paper we provide 
evidence exclusively from developing countries and extend the empirical analysis to  
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examine individual level trade preferences during 1996 from 17 countries in the South 
America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela), Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama), and North America (Mexico). In 1996 the GDP per 
capita among the 17 Latin American countries ranged from US$2150 in Bolivia to 
US$11,010 of Argentina. The interesting question is: what are the preferences of trade 
policy of individuals who live in these Latin American countries? 
We find that on average across the 17 countries in the sample, skilled workers in 
Latin America are more likely than unskilled workers to support trade. However, when 
we examine preferences in each country separately we find that although skilled were 
more likely to support trade in 15 out of the 17 countries – the relationship was only 
statistically significant in 8 of the countries. There are no countries in our sample in 
which unskilled workers are statistically more likely to support free trade than skilled 
workers. Not even in the lowest skill endowed country among our 17 Latin American 
countries. We also find that people from Latin American countries with higher GDP, 
faster growth, more cropland, and a longer period of time since reform were more likely 
on average to support free trade.     
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two summarizes 
international trade theories, which includes the standard view of inter-industry trade and 
new trade theory view of intra-industry trade and the human capital. The section also 
summarizes the empirical literature on trade preferences. Section 3 describes the data and 
presents the empirical results on who supports trade in Latin America. The last section 
concludes.  
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2.  Inter-industry Trade and The Stolper-Samuelson theorem  
The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem demonstrates the possibility that the pattern of 
comparative advantage and international trade is determined in part by national 
differences in relative factor endowments. It is evident that trade must influence the price 
of productive factors. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which relates changes in 
commodity prices to changes in real factor price, provides a fundamental prediction about 
the effects of trade on the distribution of the real income between factors. It follows that 
the relatively abundant factor gains real income in each country and the scarce factor 
loses real income under free trade. 
An alternative human capital model developed by Gabel (1988) states that a high 
degree of formal skills makes an individual more adaptable to a changing labor market. 
As trade liberalization shifts employers’ demands among high-skilled and low-skilled 
workers, workers with a relatively large pool of skills will be more likely to maintain 
their value in the market. Therefore, high-skilled individuals should be more likely to 
support free trade than low-skilled individuals in all countries, and this positive 
relationship between skill-level and support free trade sentiments should be invariant to a 
country’s factor endowment or comparative advantage. 
The Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson theorems explain why some 
individuals and countries are more protectionist than others.  Skill is found to be a critical 
factor (Baker 2003).  According to Beaulieu et al (2004a), the empirical evidence is that 
for most countries, regardless of the country endowments, skilled workers are more likely 
to oppose protectionism than unskilled workers when the country is actively engaged in 
intra-industry trade and trade policy is liberalized in this sector. Beaulieu et al (2004a)  
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find a direct relationship between the degree of intra-industry trade and the strength of 
resistance to protectionism by skilled workers within a country. They conclude that 
skilled workers in high IIT countries are more likely to support free trade than unskilled 
worker.  
Robbins (1996) examined data from nine developing countries to study the impact of 
trade liberalization upon wages. He examined labour markets in Argentina, Chile, Costa 
Rica, Colombia, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Chinese Taipei, and Uruguay and 
found that trade liberalization was accompanied by rising relative wages and labor 
demand.  His study focused on whether the evidence of these country studies supports the 
traditional HOS prediction that trade liberalization will lower wage inequality, and their 
broader implications for theory.  He found that in all these countries the relative labour 
supply grew very rapidly, and that for all expect Chinese Taipei, supply shifts had large 
negative effects upon relative wages. Based on this finding, he argue that to identify 
relative demand shifts for these countries the impact of relative supply on relative wages 
needs to be netted out to identify relative demand shifts, which may be subsequently 
related to trade liberalization and the predicted Stolper-Samuelson effects. With his 
estimation of relative demand shifts, he found that trade liberalization led not to falling, 
but rising relative wages. These findings go contrary to the “naïve” Stolper-Samuelson 
model. He also found that rising levels of imported capital stock to GDP strongly track 
rising relative demand, and argued that this is consistent with what he refers to as the 
Skill-Enhancing-Trade hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests an additional channel by 
which trade liberalization could induce rising relative demand-by rising the imported 
capital/GDP ratio, tending to raise the overall capital/GDP ratio and serving to accelerate  
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the transfer of, what in recent years appears to be skill-biased technology. He argued that 
with Skill-Enhancing Trade hypothesis, the attendant capital-skill complementarities and 
bundled technology would then raise the relative demand for skilled workers. Therefore 
trade liberalization may sometimes widen wage inequality in developing countries.  
Baker (2004) analyzed the 1995-1997 World Values Survey (WVS), which 
measured trade attitudes in 43 countries ranging in per capita income (at PPP) from 
US$832 in Nigeria to US$27,395 in the U.S.  The 43 countries include 16 that were 
below the worldwide median per capita income (US$4,000), which is based on the 166 
countries for which data are available (World Bank 2000).  That is, the survey data is 
from 43 developed and developing countries. Based on the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of 
international trade, Baker asks why some individuals and countries are more protectionist 
than others. Baker concludes that skill is found to be a critical factor, with individual skill 
being more positively correlated with free trade support in-high skill than in low-skill 
countries. 
Beaulieu et al (2004a,b) used both inter- and intra-industry North-South trade 
models to examine the effects of trade liberalization on the wage inequality. They present 
a modified Heckscher-Ohlin- Samuelson trade model with Ricardian intra-industry trade 
in the skill-intensive high-tech sector driven by international differences in technology 
lags. They found that with different technological progress and adoption lags, with intra-
industry trade within high-tech sector, a reduction in the trade barriers can 
simultaneously raise the wage gap in both developed and developing countries.  They 
argue that trade liberalization makes different wage gaps effect in North and South 
countries. For example, when the South lowers barriers to a greater degree than the  
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North, a reduction in high-tech trade barriers may result in a high wage gap in the North 
but a smaller wage gap in the South. This result is consistence with Zhu and Trefler 
(2001), which states there is a positive correlation between increasing inequality and 
growth in exports. 
Beaulieu et al (2004a) examine individual trade policy preferences across 24 
countries with different human capital endowment. They used data that from the 
international Social Survey Programme (ISSP) to examine individual trade policy 
preference across 24 countries in which intra-industry trade is heavily engaged (higher 
IIT index). They found that skilled workers in 22 of the 24 countries surveyed are more 
likely to support free trade than unskilled workers, regardless of whether or not the 
country is skilled-worker abundant. Less support free trade only in the Philippines and 
Bulgaria.  
3.  Trade Policy Reform 
The trade policy landscape in Latin America was dramatically transformed over the 
decade from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s.   Dramatic trade liberalizations occurred, 
overhauling the long-standing system of protectionist policies under import substitution.  
Liberal trade policies were the cornerstone of much broader reform packages that aimed 
to give a dominant role to the operation of private markets in economic activities, in an 
effort to improve economic efficiency and reduce the distortionary effects of state 
intervention.  The now (in)famous Washington Consensus set of policies was in fact 
initially developed as a guideline for the new  Latin American reform strategy.  Besides 
trade liberalization,  this included financial reform, tax reform, privatization and labor 
market reform.    
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While our survey data includes individuals from countries with diverse political and 
economic conditions, there were many common themes in the  reform process.  First, 
with respect to the timing of reform many countries reformed in the aftermath of the 
accumulated crises in the early 1980s of the oil price hike (1979-81), the debt shock after 
the Mexican default, the rise in US interest rates and the ensuing world recession.  
Caveats to this are the early liberalizations in Chile and Uruguay in the early 1970s, as 
well as the Colombia liberalization under President Gavaria that was undertaken without 
crisis.  In fact, the Latin American story is one of increased protection as an initial 
reaction to crisis followed by liberalization under new leadership that was no longer 
politically beholden to older protectionist interests (see Yatawara, 2001, Rajapatirana et 
al 1997).  
The trade reforms in the early 1990s involved very large reductions in applied tariff 
rates with un-weighted average tariffs in our sample of countries dropping from over 40 
per cent to 10 per cent by 1996, with all tariffs under 15 per cent. Figure 1 compares the 
average tariffs of 20 Latin American countries in 1989 and 1996. In addition to the 
reduction of average tariffs, the trade reforms were typically combined with less 
dispersion in tariff rates and reduced tariff escalation, as well as the reduced use of non- 
tariff barriers such as quotas.  The greatest progress took place between 1989 and 1994, 
although modest advances continued thereafter.  Setbacks include the growth in the use 
of anti-dumping initiations by countries such as Mexico in the 1990s.   
In addition to unilateral efforts, trade policies have had a multilateral and regional 
component.  Since the mid-1980s, 15 Latin American countries joined the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and/or its successor the World Trade  
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Organization (WTO).  This multilateral approach has expanded market access to 
formerly closed economies, bound their tariffs and facilitated a more transparent trade 
regime.   These initiatives were complemented by a rabid recourse to regional integration 
agreements in the early 1990s. The movement to preferential liberalization was so strong 
and rampant it created a complex system of overlapping preferences, dubbed a 
“spaghetti” bowl of preferences by the always eloquent Jagdish Bhagwati.  For an 
overview of the trade reforms at the time see Hester and Beaulieu (2001). Lora (2001) 
points out that from all the reform initiatives that were embarked upon, the trade reform 
process is the one that showed the most significant progress, whereas labor reform 
showed the least. Progress on tax reform, privatization and labor reform has proven more 
difficult.  Thus given that the policy change was large and effective, it is interesting to 
investigate the public’s preferences over these trade policies. 































































Source: WTO and Lora (2001)  
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4.  Who supports free trade? 
The following analysis uses the 1996 Latinobarometro to examine trade policy 
preferences.  There are 18,709 respondents and the data were collected by face-to- face 
interviews. When we exclude respondents from Spain there are 14,703 respondents with 
observations on both trade preferences and education level.  The survey question is a 
general question about the impact of trade on the national economy rather than a direct 
question on the level of support for a specific trade policy reform. The question from the 
survey is: “Generally speaking, do you think that trade with other countries, both the 
buying and selling of products, helps [nation's] economy or harms [nation's] economy?” 
An advantage of the generic question (versus a question about a specific piece of trade 
legislation) is that it avoids the potential endogeniety of interactions between policy 
preferences and political institutions.
1 Although the question refers to the benefit of trade 
in general and does not ask respondents of their views on trade policy per se, we broadly 
interpret positive responses to the trade question as a general endorsement of trade 
liberalization versus protectionism.   
We are primarily interested in whether skilled or unskilled workers are more 
supportive of trade. However we do not observe skill directly so we use the highest level 
of formal education achieved to measure individual skill. Beaulieu (2002) found that 
occupation based measures of skill are highly correlated with education based measures 
of skill (as used in the current paper) and, not surprisingly have a similar affect on trade 
policy preferences in Canada. Mayda and Rodrik (2005) found similar effects on trade 
preferences whether education or occupation data were used to measure skill across a 
                                                 
1 See Beaulieu (2002) for a discussion about the wording of different survey questions.  
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broad range of countries. In the survey data we use here, education level is defined using 
years of education completed. In the results below we classify respondents into three 
education categories: unskilled workers are those with primary education level measured 
as those with less than 6 years of education; medium skilled are those with secondary 
education (between 7 and 12 years of education); and skilled workers are those with 
tertiary education those with 13 years of education or more.  
Table 1 presents a contingency table with preferences on trade policy by education 
level. The last column of the table reveals that 11,581 (79 percent) of the respondents 
believe that trade will help their nation’s economy, while 3,122 (21 percent) are of the 
view that trade will harm their nation’s economy. It is perhaps surprising that views on 
international trade from Latin America are so positive. However Baker (2004) examines 
preferences on trade policy in Latin America from several different surveys and finds the 
same result.
2 This evidence supports the contention by Bhagwati (2004) that people from 
the south are more supportive of free trade than northern opponents of globalization 
recognize.  
Although the overall view of trade is important and interesting, in this paper we are 
more interested in the difference in preferences between the skilled and unskilled 
respondents. Looking across the columns of Table 1 we see that support for free trade 
increases with educational level. Column 1 reveals that 75 percent of those with primary 
education support international trade while the third column shows that 82 percent of 
those with tertiary education support trade.  We can compute a Pearson Chi-squared 
statistic to determine whether trade preferences and education are statistically  
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independent. The Pearson Chi square statistic of 144.67, reported in the table, rejects the 
null hypothesis that trade-policy preferences and educational attainment are statistically 
independent.  This is prima facie evidence that preferences on trade policy in Latin 
America are different for skilled and unskilled workers.  
Table 1: Preferences on free trade and education level 
Education level  Primary Secondary  Tertiary  Total 








































Pearson chi2 test for independence: 144.67                          
Based on the survey question "Generally speaking, do you think that trade with other countries,  
both the buying and selling of products, helps [nation's] economy or harms [nation's] economy?"  
Source: 1996 Latinobarometro for 17 Latin American countries. 
 
Next we will look at the preference patterns of individuals within countries and 
examine the statistical significance of the difference between skilled and unskilled 
workers by country and after controlling for other variables that may help determine 
trade preferences. We will then examine whether the patterns are different across 
countries and determine whether country characteristics are important determinants of 
individual trade preferences. 
Table 2 presents the overall support for trade among the 17 countries and compares 
the distribution of support for trade to country characteristics. The countries in the table 
are sorted from low to high average support for trade in that country. The first column 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 In fact, as the title of his paper suggests, Baker (2004) is trying to understand why trade reform is so 
popular in Latin America.   
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reports that even in the low support countries – the support for trade is strong with 70 
percent of respondents supporting trade from the five countries with lower support. 
Support was 77 percent for the next group of countries and 87 percent for the group with 
the strongest support.  
Table 2:  Support trade and country characteristics 
 
The next seven columns in the table present statistics describing the countries based 
on: GDP per capita; education endowment; intra-industry trade (IIT); average annual 
economic growth in the 1990s; the share of cropland; average 1995 tariffs; and the 
number of years since trade reforms. This comparison provides a look at whether the 















Countries with lower support for trade
Paraguay 63.3% 5260 0.84 0.05 1.8 0.2 9.3 5
Honduras 70.3% 2800 0.71 0.14 3.1 3.2 9.8
Mexico 70.7% 7100 0.86 0.61 3.0 1.3 13.1 11
Venezuela 73.0% 5670 0.84 0.17 1.1 0.9 13.4 7
Guatemala 74.5% 4000 0.65 0.32 4.0 5.0 10.0
Overall 70.3% 4966 0.78 0.26 2.6 2.1 11.1 8
Countries with medium support for trade
Brazil 75.2% 6580 0.90 0.50 2.7 0.9 11.1 6
Bolivia 76.1% 2150 0.85 0.06 3.6 0.2 9.7 11
Peru 77.3% 4260 0.88 0.12 4.1 0.4 16.3 6
Uruguay 77.7% 8090 0.93 0.32 2.0 0.2 9.3 2
Argentina 79.0% 11010 0.94 0.43 2.7 0.5 10.5 7
Ecuador 80.0% 3140 0.85 0.13 1.9 4.9 12.3 6
Overall 77.6% 5872 0.89 0.21 2.9 1.2 11.6 6
Countries with highest support for trade
Costa Rica 82.0% 7880 0.86 0.33 4.9 5.9 10.3 9
El Salvador 84.2% 4670 0.74 0.35 4.3 12.1 10.2
Chile 86.9% 7090 0.89 0.16 5.9 0.4 11.0 20
Nicaragua 87.2% 2520 0.66 0.06 4.3 1.9 10.7
Colombia 89.2% 7730 0.85 0.27 2.3 1.7 13.3 6
Panama 90.7% 5040 0.86 0.28 4.2 2.0 10.0
Overall 86.7% 5822 0.81 0.24 4.3 4.0 10.9 12
All countries 78.4% 6188 0.84 0.28 3.29 2.45 11.19 8 
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countries. We will present some econometric evidence on the relationships later, but this 
provides a first look at the patterns.   
GDP per capita allows us to see if the pattern of support for relatively high-income 
countries in the region is different than the pattern of support in low-income countries. 
GDP per capita also acts as a proxy for country skill endowments. Mayda and Rodrik 
(2005) are very critical and skeptical of the measures of education attainment reported by 
UNCTAD and prefer to use GDP per capita. In this paper we use GDP per capita and an 
education index from the Human Development Indicators. This index is based on the 
adult literacy rate and the combined primary secondary and tertiary gross enrolment 
ratio.
3  As the second column shows, GDP per capita is higher in countries that are more 
supportive of trade. On the other hand, there does not seem to be a strong pattern for the 
measure of country education endowment. 
We include an index of intra-industry trade IIT.  Contrary to the results found in 
Beaulieu et al (2004) there does not seem be a pattern between country IIT and support 
for trade. This could be because the group of countries examined by Beaulieu et al (2004) 
is predominantly higher income countries in which intra-industry trade is a large share of 
total trade.  
There does seem to be a pattern between trade support and economic growth in the 
country. Countries with higher support for trade tended to be countries that grew faster in 
the 1990s. Growth rates were 4 percent on average for countries with more support and 
were only 2.6 percent for countries with the lowest level of support for trade. The share 
                                                 
3 Note that Beaulieu et al (2004) use GDP per capita, education enrollment, and the number of research 
scientists and technicians per population as a proxy for country skill endowment. Baker (2004) uses the 
average GDP per capita (at PPP) from 1990 to 1995 (World Bank 2000) and the percent of the population  
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of cropland in the country also seems to be correlated with trade preferences. It looks like 
support for trade may be higher in countries with a higher percent of cropland. Again, 
below we examine whether these relationships are statistically significant.  
There does not seem to be a pattern between the average level of a tariff in 1995 and 
support for trade. Similarly, the number of years since reform does not seem to be related 
to support for trade. Before examining whether these patterns have a statistical 
relationship we take a closer look at whether skilled or unskilled workers in the 17 
countries are more supportive of trade as indicated in Table 1. First we will look at the 
results separately for each country and then we will examine the econometric results from 
pooling the data together. 
Table 3 presents the marginal effects from regressing trade preferences on individual 
characteristics including education levels; gender, age, and marital status. Age is years of 
age, gender is a categorical variable that is 1 for males and 0 for females; the marital 
variable is category variable that is 1 for married and 0 for single, separate, or other.  
In Table 3, only the marginal effects for education are reported due to space 
constraints but all of the control variables (age, gender and marital status) are included in 
the regressions.  The education variables are categorical variables with “edu2” 
representing those with secondary education and “edu3” representing those with tertiary 
education.  Those with primary education are the omitted category.  The countries are 
sorted from low to high GDP per capita. The marginal effects on dummy variables are 
interpreted as the effect on the probability of support free trade for a discrete change.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
that had at least some tertiary education in 1995. The results are similar for these different proxies for, and  
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Table 3:  Marginal effects of education on support free trade by country 
sort by IIT index 
Note: Marginal effects are reported for education variables only and based on the probit model that 
includes control variables. The dependent variable Y=1 if respondent support free trade and Y=0 
otherwise. Thus a positive marginal effect coefficient implies a higher probability of support free trade.  
Edu2 is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the respondent’s highest level of education is secondary; Edu3 a 
categorical variable equal to 1 if the respondent’s highest level of education is tertiary.  The omitted 
category is primary education. 
Superscript * represents statistically significant at the 5% level and ** is 1% level. 
The results are mixed.  As seen in Table 3, the highly skilled (those with tertiary 
education) are more likely to support trade than those with primary education in 15 out of 
17 Latin American countries.  However, this difference in preferences between skilled 
and unskilled is statistically significant at the 1 or 5 percent level in only 6 out of 17 
Latin American countries. In a seventh country, Paraguay, skilled workers are more 
supportive of trade than unskilled workers and although the individual education 
variables are not statistically significant, the secondary and tertiary variables are jointly 
significant. So in these seven countries there is a statistically significant difference in 
                                                                                                                                                 












BOLIVIA 2150 0.13 (0.047) * 0.20 (0.060) ** 12.8 ** 686 0.036
NICARAGUA 2520 0.01 (0.032) 0.03 (0.032) 0.6 857 0.004
HONDURAS 2800 -0.07 (0.055) 0.01 (0.053) 5.2 744 0.007
ECUADOR 3140 0.11 (0.038) ** 0.16 (0.043) ** 14.7 ** 1126 0.025
GUATEMALA 4000 0.25 (0.242) 0.14 (0.212) 1.9 467 0.031
PERU 4260 -0.06 (0.060) -0.02 (0.056) 3.1 961 0.009
EL SALVADOR  4670 0.13 (0.044) ** 0.23 (0.065) ** 15.8 ** 633 0.032
PANAMA 5040 -0.06 (0.243) 0.13 (0.212) 1.0 458 0.046
PARAGUAY 5260 -0.06 (0.086) 0.07 (0.084) 7.6 * 476 0.025
VENEZUELA 5670 0.00 (0.039) 0.11 (0.038) ** 15.9 ** 1235 0.025
BRAZIL 6580 -0.02 (0.122) 0.37 (0.148) * 10.8 ** 1000 0.015
CHILE 7090 -0.05 (0.052) 0.00 (0.048) 4.3 1001 0.007
MEXICO 7100 -0.14 (0.178) 0.10 (0.177) 9.2 ** 1282 0.013
COLOMBIA 7730 0.03 (0.027) 0.08 (0.028) ** 11.8 ** 1138 0.028
COSTA RICA  7880 0.31 (0.172) 0.31 (0.184) 3.5 681 0.009
URUGUAY 8090 -0.28 (0.162) -0.15 (0.165) 3.7 1056 0.005







Std error Std error 
  17
trade preferences between skilled and unskilled. A striking result on trade preferences in 
Latin America is that those with tertiary education are less likely to support trade than 
those with primary education in only two countries: Peru and Uruguay. In neither case is 
this difference statistically significant. 
There does not appear to be a pattern in terms of the level of GDP.  That is, there 
does not appear to be a correlation between country GDP per capita and the countries 
where there is a statistically significant difference between skilled and unskilled workers 
in preferences on trade policy. Skilled workers are more supportive of trade than 
unskilled in some of the countries with the lowest GDP per capita like Bolivia, Ecuador 
and El Salvador.  On the other hand, Venezuela, Brazil, Mexico and Columbia are the 
only higher income countries in Latin America where skilled workers are more 
supportive of trade than unskilled workers in a statistically significant manner.  Figure 2 
presents a scatter plot of the marginal effect of skill on trade preferences by GDP per 
capita. The diagram reveals that there is a weak positive relationship between the trade 
preferences of skilled workers and the GDP per capita. Beaulieu et al (2004) and Mayda 
and Rodrik (2005) show a similar diagram covering a broader cross section of countries 
and find a stronger relationship between GDP per capita and skilled preferences (a 
stronger positive slope). However, Figure 2 also shows that the marginal effect is 
negative in only two countries. In Peru (PER) the marginal effect is almost zero and in 
Uruguay the result is large in absolute terms. However, as pointed out above in neither 
case are the marginal effects statistically significant.      
As mentioned above, GDP per capita is a good proxy for the education endowment 
of a country. Previous research found that the difference in support of trade between  
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skilled and unskilled workers was larger in high GDP per capita countries and smaller in 
low GDP per capita countries.  There does not appear to be a strong pattern appearing in 
these data for Latin American countries.   
 
When the respondents from all countries are pooled together we find that skilled 
workers in Latin America systematically tend to have a greater preference for trade 
liberalization than their unskilled counterparts.  The results from estimating seven 
different models using pooled data are reported in Table 4.  The first model presents the 
results from the same sort of regression as presented in Table 3.  It regresses support for 
trade on the individual education variables, on age, sex, and marital status. Country 
dummy variables are used to control for fixed country effects.  The next seven models 
presented in Table 4 examine whether country characteristics affect individual trade 
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Figure 2: Trade preferences of skilled versus unskilled and GDP per capita 
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trade than those with primary education in all models and the result is statistically 
significant in six out of the seven models. This can be seen by looking across the row of 
tertiary education where the coefficient is statistically significant in six of the models. 
The bottom row of the table presents the joint significance of education and the education 
variables are statistically significant in all cases except columns 2 and 6.  
Table 4: Pooled regression results 
 
The results on education are robust to including interaction terms into the regression.  
The focus here is on whether or not country characteristics like IIT or GDP per capita 
affect the relationship between individual education level and preferences on trade 
Secondary education (edu2) 0.013 0.043 0.027 0.005 -0.032 * 0.026 0.005
(0.011) (0.030) (0.022) (0.029) (0.016) (0.073) (0.027)
Tertiary education (edu3) 0.071 ** 0.101 ** 0.084 ** 0.088 ** 0.033 ** 0.046 0.064 *
(0.012) (0.030) (0.022) (0.029) (0.015)* (0.073) (0.027)
Gender (male = 1) 0.038 ** 0.036 ** 0.036 ** 0.036 ** 0.035 ** 0.036 ** 0.04 **
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 0.000
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Country interaction with edu2 -0.007 -0.084 0.001 0.018 ** -0.002 0.001
(0.005) (0.074) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003)
Country interaction with edu3 -0.007 -0.085 -0.01 0.013 ** 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.073) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003)
Country characteristic 0.010 * 0.008 0.027 ** -0.009 * -0.001 0.002
(0.005) (0.067) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003)
Observations 14703 14703 14703 14703 14703 14703 11544
Pseudo R
2 0.033 0.007 0.008 0.012 0.009 0.007 0.009
Joint signifiance of education 76.30 ** 15.97 ** 24.21 ** 22.73 ** 49.46 ** 0.48 14.80 **
Joint signifiance of country 
characteristics 7.34 12.34 ** 79.40 ** 23.31 ** 0.88 14.17 **
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Statistical significance: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The dependent variable is dichotomous equal to "1" for support for trade as defined above. The results reported here are marginal coefficients. The tests for joint 
significance reported are Chi-squared statistics. 
+ In the regression with no country interactions country fixed effects were included.
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policy.  In this case the interaction terms are not significant.  These results are starkly 
different from the results of previous researchers.  One result that holds true is that on 
average people from higher GDP per capita countries are more supportive of trade.  
However, GDP per capita does not modify the difference in preferences between skilled 
and unskilled. 
5.  CONCLUSION 
While free trade may result in aggregate consumption gains, these gains are not 
necessarily distributed evenly among the members of society. Indeed, it is possible that 
certain groups will actually be worse off in a situation of free trade than in an autarky or a 
restricted trade situation.  This paper extends the empirical analysis of who supports free 
trade to Latin America.  It finds that on average in Latin America, skilled workers are 
more supportive of trade than unskilled.  It also finds that on average, people from high 
GDP per capita countries are more supportive than those from low GDP per capita 
countries.  Skilled workers are only more likely to support trade than unskilled workers 
in 8 out of 17 Latin American countries.  This is in stark contrast to earlier work that 
found stronger support among skilled workers across a range of transition economies.  
  21
References        
Baker, Andy (2004) “Why is Trade Reform so Popular in Latin America? A 
Consumption Based Theory of Trade Policy Preferences.” World Politics 55: 423-
455. 
______ (2005) “Who Wants to Globalize?  Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a 
Theory of Trade Policy Beliefs” forthcoming American Journal of Political 
Science.  
Beaulieu, Eugene (2002) "Factor or Industry Cleavages in Trade Policy: An Empirical 
Analysis of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem," Economics and Politics. Vol 14(2), 
July 2002, p. 99-131. 
Beaulieu, Eugene, Michael Benarroch, and James Gaisford (2001) “Intra-Industry Trade 
Liberalization: Why Skilled Workers in Most Countries Resist Protectionism.” 
Economic Research Papers-Loughborough University Department of Economics, 
December 2001 
________  (2004a) “Intra-Industry Trade Liberalization, Wage Inequality and Trade 
Policy Preference” University of Calgary, March 2004. 
________  (2004b) “Trade Barriers and Wage Inequality in a North-South Model with 
Technology Driven Intra-Industry Trade.” Journal of Development Economics. 
Volume 75, Issue 1, pp. 113-136, October 2004. 
Bhagwati, Jagdish (2004) In Defense of Globalization. Oxford University Press. 
Das, S.P. (2002) “Foreign Direct Investment and the Relative wage in Developing 
Country,” Journal of Development Economics, 67, 55-77, 2002 
Gabel, Matthew (1998) Interests and Integration: Market Liberalization, Public Opinion, 
and the European Union. Ann arbour: University of Michigan Press 1998 
Lora E. (2001) Structural Reforms in Latin America: What has been Reformed and How 
to Measure it? Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper. 
Lora E. and U. Panizza (2002)  Structural Reforms in Latin America under Scrutiny – 
Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper. 
Mayda, Anna Maria and Dani Rodrik (2005) “Why are Some People More Protectionist 
than Others?” European Economic Review, forthcoming.  
  22
O’Rourke, Kevin and Richard Sinnott. “What Determines Attitudes toward Protection? 
Some Cross-Country Evidence.” In Brooking Trade Forum 2001, eds. Susan M. 
Collins 
Rajapatirana, Sarath, Luz Maria de la Mora Sanchez, and Ravindra A. Yatawara. (1997) 
“Political Economy of Trade Reforms 1965–94: Latin American Style.” World 
Economy 20(3): 307–38. 
Yatawara, Ravi A ( 2001) “Timing is Everything: The  Determinants of Commercial 
Policy Changes”, University of Delaware Working Paper 
Zhu, S.C. and D. Trefler. “ Ginis in General Equilibrium: Trade, Technology and 
Southern Inequality,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 
#8446, 2001 